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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
-vs-
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
ESTATE OF B. J. Silliman, Deceased, 
KENNETH SILLIMAN, Executor, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
11,301 
The respondent admits that the statement of facts as 
setforth in appellant's brief are substantially correct ex-
L:ept the following items should be added or modified: 
(a) A portion of the subject land is drained by 
washes and gullies, but the greater portion is flat and 
level and is covered with the usual desert grazing foilage. 
(b) A portion of the subject land borders and is ad-
jacent to the Green River City limits for a distance of 
1f2 mile where there is available to the property sewer 
and water facilities; the property is traversed by a power 
line and telephone line and the Denver and Rio Grande 
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Western Railroad traverses through a large section of 
the property for a distance of % of a mile with a rail-
road siding and railroad-truck dumping facilities~ (Ex. 
P-1 & E.x. D-2 and testimony of Kenneth N. Silliman, Tr. 
30) 
(c) That the property adjacent to the railroad sid-
ing and dumping area where taken in fee completely by 
the State. 
(d) After acquisition by the State, the respondent 
will have no access to the property North of the project 
except for that area North of the railroad tracks upon 
which is located the air strip of the Green River Airport, 
or South of the project, except for a very limited access 
to the extreme Southeast portion of the property by 
County Road over extremely rough terrain. (See testi-
mony of Appellant's witness 1W. J. Merkley, Tr. 17 & 19) 
The respondent further admits that the only issue 
tried was the evaluation of the property to be expropriated, 
and damages, if any, by reason of severance, less benefit 
accruing, if any, by reason of construction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRE-
TION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NE1W TRIAL. 
The trial court, acting within its discretion, refused 
a motion by the appellant for a new trial conditioned on 
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respondent's accepting a remittitur of the severance dam-
ages of $2,536.00 which reduced the severance damages 
from $15,023,.50 to $12,487.50. The latter figure being the 
amount of the severance damage as testified to by Ken-
neth N. Silliman and the two expert witnesses for respon-
dent. 
In the recent case of The State of Utah by and through 
its Road Commission vs. George Kendell, et. al., 20 Utah 
2nd 356, 438 P. 2nd 178, this Court said: 
"The law is well settled in this State that the 
trial court may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, 
order a remittitur in lieu of granting a new trial where 
damages appear to have been given under the influ-
ence of passion or prejudice. Geary v. Cain, 69 Utah 
340, 255 P. 416. In Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 
184 P. 2d 123, this court said at page 436 of the Utah 
Reports: 
'Where we can say, as a matter of law, that 
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have 
been given under the influence of passion or pre-
judice, and the trial court abused its discretion or 
.acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a mo-
tion for a new trial, we may order the verdict set 
aside and a new trial granted ... But mere ex-
cessiveness of a verdict, without more, does not 
necessarily show that the verdict was arrived at 
by passion or prejudice .... It is true that the ver-
dict might be so grossly excessive and dispropor-
tionate to the injury that we could say from that 
fact alone that as a matter of law the verdict must 
have been arrived at by passion or prejudice. But 
the facts must be such that the excess can be de-· 
termined as a matter of law, or the verdict must 
be so excessive as to be shocking to one's con-
science and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice, 
or corruption on the part of the jury ... ' 
The matter of any passion or prejudice, if any, on the 
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part of the jury was answered by the trial court when the 
remittitur was ordered and accepted. In any event, the 
amount of the excessiveness in this case would certainly 
not be "shocking to one's conscience" and the Court did 
not abuse its discretion when the amount fixed as sever-
ance damage was supported by sworn testimony. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
ALLOWING THE JURY TO CONSIDER THE; ARGU-
MENT OF RESPONDENT'S CLOSING STATEMENT IN 
EXPRESSING LOSS OF INCOME AS AN E:LEMENT OF 
DETERMINING MARKET VALUE. 
There was testimony that there existed the refuse 
dump of Green River City on a portion of the property 
being taken by the appellant and that there was an in-
come to the defendant from the dump in the sum of $30.00 
per month. The dump was located in the South portion of 
the area colored blue on defendant's E~hibit 2, (Tr. 36). 
The testimony of Mr. J. W. Hammond, Jr., (Tr. 68) 
as set out in appellant's brief, page 8, shows that the ele-
ment of loss of rental income under these circumstances 
was considered by him in arriving at market value. 
A multitude of cases are cited supporting this general 
proposition as set out in 65 ALR 456, where it is stated: 
"As a general rule courts accede to the rule th.at 
income from property in the way of rents and profits 
is an element of consideration in arriving at the mar-
ket value or measure of compensation to be paid for 
taking property in condemnation proceedings." 
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For a similar statement see 18 Am. Jur. 902. And in 
29A C. J. S. 1198, we find the following: 
"Although testimony pertaining to income de-
rived mainly from the skill of the operator of a busi-
ness rather than from the productivity of the proper-
ty should be excluded, the annual rent or income which 
it produces, and the profits derived from the use of the 
property are admissable whenever they would be an 
indication of value. 
Respondent's councel, in his closing argument, merely 
made the following comment: 
"So he (Mr. Hammond) placed a value on that 
property, increased its value, because of its income of 
$'3,000.00" (Tr. 234). 
The argument was a proper statement of how Mr. 
Hammond arrived at his appraisal figure. 
However, the objection raised by appellant under this 
Point, if error was committed, was not prejudicial since 
the jury did not accept Mr. Hammond's figures on the 
value of the property taken. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT E:RR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE: TESTIMONY 
DF RESPONDENT'S APPRAISEHS: 
A. RESPONDENT'S \VITNESS, MR. KENNE,TH N. SIL-
LIMAN, DIJD BASE HIS TESTIMONY ON A BEFORE 
AND AFTER VALUE. 
All of respondent's witnesses placed different values 
upon different parcels of land according to their highest 
and best use and testified from Defendant's Exhibit 2 
where the different parcels were set out in different colors 
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with the acreage of each parcel inserted on the exhibit 
(See the stipulation of counsel, Tr. 38). 
Mr. Silliman testified to an acre value on each parcel 
without computing the totals and was then pressed on cross 
examination by the appellant's councel to give such a total. 
Q. Mr. Silliman, do you have an opinion as to the val-
ue of the property prior to the acquistion on July 9, 
1966? I think I finished. I might have missed a word. 
Do you have an opinion as to the value of the subject 
property -
A. In what area? 
Q. - prior to the acquisition date of July 9, 1966? 
A. In what area? Taking the area? 
Q. The pink area? 
A. Beg Pardon? 
Q. The pink area that you see on Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 1? 
A. Well, it would have a different value with me. It 
would, as I have already stated, the part up by the 
east and by the railroad would have a -
Q. Well, do you have a total value? If you were to SB:Y 
for instance testify to the value of all the area that is 
enclosed in the pink as to its value ? . . . . . 
Q. Mr. Silliman, do you have an opinion of the value 
of the subject property prior to the acquisition by the 
State? 
A. Now my opinion of what it was worth? 
Q. W·ell, you have stated an opinion on the. ~tand; 
whatever opinion you prefer to call it; your op1mon or 
someone else's opinion. 
A. Well, but do you - are you going to con~ider th~ 
land values of the various areas we have designated· 
Q. If I may ask the questions. I didn't know how you 
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broke it down. But if you were to offer the pink por-
tions for sale, Mr. Silliman, what would you say they 
were worth prior to the acquisition by the State? You 
have a before value? 
A. I thought that is the testimony that I gave. (Tr. 39 
40 & 41) ' 
Mr. Silliman was then further pressed and gave the 
answer set out in appellant's brief, "I - - approximately 
$50,000.00." 
Immediately following this approximation we find this 
question by appellant's counsel and this answer by Mr. 
Silliman: 
Q. Do you have a total value? 
A. No, sir, I don't. I would have to add that up and 
multiple it. (Tr. 43) 
B. THE OPINIJ:Pel OF RESPONDENT'S WITNEISS, MR. 
CARL J. LEAVITT, WAS BASED ON FAIR MARKET 
VALUE AND AS OF THE DATE OF TAKING. 
Mr. Leavitt was the President of the Bank in Green 
River, Utah, and has been appraising property in that area 
since 1941. (Tr. 91 & 92) He was asked the following ques-
tions on direct examination. 
Q. And now, Mr. Leavitt, or perhaps we can save time 
in referring to Exhibit 2. You were present when Mr. 
Hammond testified, were you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And without going specifically into each of the col-
ored areas that - well, let me ask you this. Mr. Leav-
itt, of course you have seen this exhibit before you 
were here in court today? 
A. Right. 
Q. You examined it in my office. Is that correct? 
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A. Right. 
Q. Without going into specifically the various colors 
I will ask you whether or not your testimony as to 
your opinion as to reasonable value would be the same 
as Mr. Hammond's? 
A. Yes. (Tr. 94 & 95) 
Mr. Hammond's testimony was very explicit that the 
appraisal was made as of the date of taking and that the 
willing ·seller-willing buyer principal was the proper princi-
pal to apply in determing market value. 
C. THE OPINION OF RESPONDENT'S WITNESS, MR. 
J. W. HAMMOND, DID NO'l' SHOW ANY SPECIAL BEN-
EFITS TO DEDUCT FROM SEV·ERANCE DAMAGES. 
Mr. Hammond testified on cross examination as fol-
lows: 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to the benefits derived? 
A. No, I have no opinion. (Tr. 88) 
The matter was further covered by him as follows: 
Q. Mr. Hammond, in your opinion then the benefit de-
rived from the remaining property can be more than 
the severance damage suffered by the estate of B. J. 
Silliman. Is that true? 
A. I have no opinion as to that because I don't know 
the extent of their holdings. It is just my understand-
ing that they do have, knowing these people, that they 
do have some additional property north of there. I 
don't know how much they have. I have no opinion as 
to that. I haven't, I haven't even thought about it. (Tr. 
89) 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
ing appellant's motion for a new trial. If there was any 
passion or prejudice shown by the jury the court corrected 
that matter in ordering the remittitur in the amount of 
severance damage to conform to the evidence presented. 
The great discrepancy in the appraised value between 
the witnesses for the appellant ($6,296 .. 50) and the ap-
praisal of the witnesses for the respondent ($54,234.70) 
was a difference in the classification of use of the prop-
erty. Appellant's witnesses gave the land only one use; 
grazing, except for Mr. Memory Cain who gave a commer-
cial use to two acres of the 633.7 acres involved. (Tr. 119) 
Respondent's witnesses gave the land three uses, depend-
ing on location and accessibility to highway, railroad, util-
ities and Green River City Limits; commercial, industrial 
and grazing. There. was presented evidence of other sales 
of land in the area similar to a portion of the respondent's 
land where the other land sold for $1,000.00 per acre or 
more. (Tr. 32 & 33, Tr. 118). This evidence gave credence 
to the testimony of respondent's witnesses and the jury 
obviously accepted evidence as presented by both parties 
and returned a verdict of considerably less thatl the re-
spondent's introduced opinions and more than those of the 
appellant. 
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The jury at the conclusion of the evidence, on motion 
of the appellant, viewed the premises, considered all of 
the evidence and arrived at a reasonable verdict. I am sure 
a new trial would give us a similar result. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BOYD BUNNELL 
Attorney for Respondent 
Oliveto Building 
Price, Utah 
